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Abstract 
Export growth and a productive agriculture sector has proved to be instrumental in 
many development trajectories.  Often, these two outcomes have significant political 
explanations. This research aims at examining the impact of state-business relations on the 
growth of the floriculture industry in Kenya. In this thesis, I argue that the relationship 
between ruling elites, bureaucrats, and capitalists is a central factor in explaining the 
increases in sector productivity and overall sector growth. Using an intensive single-case 
study, I am able to identify the concepts and processes that make up state-business relations 
in a development context. I argue that mutual interests between ruling elites and capitalists, 
in combination with an embedded, productivity-driven bureaucracy, create an environment 
that is conducive to favourable policies and increasing productivity. By looking at the 
dynamic between flower industry capitalists and the Kenyan state, and the policy outcomes 
that result from this dynamic, I find that state-business relations have been an instrumental 
factor in the sustained growth of the industry.  
Keywords: Africa, Kenya, Policy, Agriculture, State-business relations 
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1. Introduction 
 
This thesis will analyse the effect that state-business relations have on the growth of Kenya’s 
floriculture industry. Many scholars have highlighted the importance of agriculture in 
development. Gollin et. al. (2002) find that an improvement in agricultural productivity can 
be a catalyst for industrialisation and economic growth.  Fernando (2012) identified 
agricultural development as the starting point of Malaysia’s development path. The World 
Bank’s 2008 World Development report in 2008 argued that agriculture is the key to lifting 
the world’s “bottom billion” out of poverty. In the WDR, it is highlighted that in developing 
countries, 70% poverty-stricken people are rural based, and that, on average, agriculture 
provides 30% of the GDP(compared to a mere 6% in developed economies) (World Bank 
2008, p6). It is thus logical that increased agricultural productivity can make a big difference 
to the reduction of poverty in rural economies.  The WDR rightly shows that higher 
agricultural productivity served as a precedent underpinning of industrialization and large-
scale economic growth (p.35). Agricultural surplus can be taxed to finance industrial 
development, and lower food prices stimulate economic growth (WDR 2008). Agricultural 
transformation formed the base for economic development in many Southeast Asian 
countries (van Donge & Henley 2012).  
 
As the WDR rightfully points out, major improvements in supply chain technologies 
have provided Southern producers with lucrative opportunities in high-value agricultural 
exports. However, developing successful agribusiness sectors is not without challenges.  Why 
have some parts of the world enjoyed an “upgrade” in agribusiness growth, while others have 
lagged behind?  To help answer this question, this thesis will study the growth of the Kenyan 
floriculture industry from 2002 onwards. This industry is an exceptionally growing agro-
 Paardekooper 5 
export sector that has been one of the driving forces of the Kenyan economy since the turn of 
the century. There are various structural political-economic semi-structural factors that have 
shaped the growth of the sector: political instability / risk has a significant negative effect on 
investment (Jensen 2009). Investments and sector development are institutionally 
contextualised (WDR 2008). Thus, policies and institutions must not be overlooked. As will 
be shown below, the nature of the relationship between the state and capitalists is crucial to 
the development as a sector. The 2008 WDR agrees: producer organisations help address 
market failures and create incentives for change (p. 248).  Intense interaction between the 
state and agricultural capital has a long and important history in Kenya, but since the 
liberalising market reforms in the 1990s, the dynamics have changed significantly (Bates 
1981, 1989; Hopewell 2014).  Before the reforms, the state directly intervened heavily in 
agriculture through marketing boards and other interventionist measures, and formal SBR’s 
(interest groups) are now the main mode of communication between state and capital in many 
countries.  How have state-business relations been conducive to the sector’s successful 
development in neoliberal Kenya? While there is a substantial amount of theory and 
quantitative work surrounding this relationship and its effect on development, there is still a 
significant research gap in qualitative work in Africa.  
 
The floriculture industry in Kenya is an interesting case for several reasons. First, its 
growth is very impressive: according to industry statistics, its total exports grew from around 
11,000 tons in 1988 to 136,000 tons in 2014 (Kenya Flower Council; HCDA). Floriculture 
accounts for about half the total horticultural export value, and employs over 500,000 people. 
It is a very labour-intensive sector, which brings a lot of FDI into Kenya and with it, 
potentially valuable agricultural technologies that can spill over to other sectors. Moreover, 
the vast majority of flowers is exported, bringing in foreign exchange to a country with a 
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considerable trade deficit. Seen in the context of many failing African industries, this is 
potentially an example-setting case. In his comprehensive analysis of the Ethiopian 
floriculture industry, Belwal (2008) identifies the emergence of a business association as a 
key catalyst to industry growth, but does not specify the specific mechanisms surrounding 
this. Therefore, this research aims to clarify these mechanisms, and to show that state-
business relations are central to the political economy of agribusiness growth. The Kenyan 
Floriculture industry from 2002 onwards is an excellent case for this. 
 
This thesis will proceed as follows. First, I will provide an overview of the academic 
debate that this thesis is adding to. Next, I provide a theoretical framework and methodology 
with which data will be collected and analysed. The analysis will start with a brief 
background to the growth of the industry, after which the theoretical framework will be 
applied to establish whether productivity-enhancing state-business relations are present in our 
case. Finally, I will provide two cases that highlight the productivity potential that state-
business relations have to offer. 
2. Research Question and Objectives 
 
The objective of this study is to determine how collaborative relations between the state and 
capitalists can be conducive (or unconducive) to the growth of an industry. To translate this 
objective into a question: Are state-business relations conducive to growth in Kenya’s 
floriculture industry? It is easier to answer this question through sub-questions: 
1. What is the relationship between the interests of Kenya’s ruling elites and 
those of the flower sector capitalists? 
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2. To what extent has the state allied with the capitalists in the floriculture 
industry? 
3. To what extent does this alliance enhance productivity and growth? 
Please note that this research looks for the influence of SBR on sector growth, and is 
not expecting a monocausal link between SBR and sector growth. As I will show, the growth 
in Kenyan floriculture has had many enabling factors, and cannot possibly be explained by 
political factors.  
 
3. Literature review 
 
The debate surrounding the relationship between policy and sector growth has been 
somewhat turbulent in recent years. The “Washington Consensus” dominance of market-
based development seems to be losing ground as industrial policy is back on the menu in 
many countries. The 1990s were characterised by marketisation of national economies built 
on Williamson (1990)’s ‘Washington Consensus’. In African countries, this discourse quickly 
materialised into policy often forced through ‘structural adjustment’, where the state had to 
privatise the public services and liberalise its trade policy in order to be considered for debt 
alleviation. However, non-intervention has not been unanimously accepted by academic and 
policy-making circles. After the (sometimes-disastrous) consequences of such policies 
became visible, development scholars seem to have taken a more nuanced approach to the 
role of the state in economic development. Henley (2012, 2015)’s work on the development 
divergence between Africa and Southeast Asia reveals that effective agricultural policy such 
as fertiliser promotion and irrigation is crucial to the success of a sector. Other accounts of 
Southeast Asian growth trajectories underline this. (Kay 2002, Djurfeld 2005). Kurtz (2001) 
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argues that several mechanisms available to states can enhance agricultural sectors even 
within a neoliberal framework. He finds that “export promotion, targeted credit and public 
infrastructure investment” (p. 15) are all effective in developing a successful agro-export 
sector. Kurtz’ study of the Chilean political economy is a good example of neoliberal states 
that successfully intervene in their economies to build a strong export orientation.  
 
Whitfield et al (2015), conduct an analysis of several African cases of industrial 
policy, looking to revive sectors of their economy. They find that the political incentives and 
dynamics behind the formulation of policies have a huge effect on the success of such 
policies. Political incentives and the balance of power between elites is essential to the 
formation of policy, they argue.  Robinson (2009) underlines this: “So Industrial policy can 
work, but it may not work. The difference lies in the objectives and functioning of the 
institutions implementing the policies, and these are determined by the political system.” 
(Robinson 71). As Whitfeld shows, this process is even more complicated in many African 
states. Many African states are characterised by a low capacity, where personal rent-seeking 
and graft are endemic to the political process. The case studies in Whitfeld’s book show that 
it is not the rents per sé that stifle African development, but what is done with them. Expert 
on African developmentalism Mkandawire (2001) agrees: “The key question is: will wealth 
collected in the form of  rents lead to productive investment?” (Mkandawire 2001, pp 301). 
 
It is thus conducive to analyse the political processes behind successful agricultural 
policy. One of the factors that Whitfield et al. emphasise is the role of capitalists in the 
formation of policy. State-business relations have long been an important aspect of the 
political economy of development, and there are many avenues still left to study, particularly 
in Africa. Both Whitfeld and other scholars such as Holmquist and Mkandawire point to a 
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factor in this equation that makes most African countries a unique object of study in 
development economics and state-business relations: the absence of large groups of domestic 
capitalists (Whitfeld et al. 2015, Holmquist 2002, Mkandawire 2001). Mkwandawire 
describes how in most African economies the majority of rent was collected straight from the 
peasant class without mediation from a moderately powerful bourgeoisie. This means that 
state-business relations have a different context in Africa than in East Asia, where they have 
been hailed to be a major component of the “developmental state” (Mkandawire 2001, Evans 
1995).  There is a significant literature on the relationship between state-business relation and 
economic performance. It is hard to find quality literature focused on SBR specifically in 
African agriculture, but the interactions should be similar across sectors. In his seminal work, 
Porter (1990) identifies that having influence on policies and regulations can significantly 
increase the chances of success of an industry. Various studies have since shown that 
collective action by entrepreneurs can have significant effects on productivity through policy 
(Doner and Schneider 2000, Shiferaw et al. 2011). Most of the qualitative proof comes from 
Asia during the rise of what we would now call the Asian Tigers and the Newly Industrialised 
countries. In Business and the State in Development Countries (1997), Maxfeld & Schneider 
give compelling evidence to how state-society relations are conducive to significant 
economic growth. The literature describes the ability of business representatives to 
communicate market failures and information to ruling elites, reduce uncertainty and provide 
a check on policies. Can we expect the same dynamics in Africa? An insightful paper by Sen 
& Te Velde (2009) conducts a quantitative study on the relationship between state-business 
relation and economic development in African countries. They find that, statistically, strong 
state-business relations contribute significantly to economic performance. However, there is 
still significant room for qualitative approaches to the SBR-dynamic in Africa.  
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4. Analytical Framework 
 
In order to answer the research questions, a conceptual framework is needed. The framework 
described below draws on various theories on SBR and its effect on policy, and will provide a 
coherent causal story to work with. It is important to take into consideration that I am not at 
any point suggesting a monocausal relationship between SBR and sectoral growth, as it has 
been shown that overall macroeconomic and political stability as well as various 
environmental and meteorological factors also have a major effect on sector growth.  
 
Most broadly speaking, SBRs are relationships between the public and the private 
sector. They can be public and private, or any intermediate form of relationship (Lemma and 
te Velde, 3). In Africa, one often finds a personalised state-business relation along with a 
personalised rule. If said elites have a long-term vision and rent collection is centralised, a 
SBR system that is highly personalised yet economically effective can be the result, which 
Booth (2012) calls Developmental Patrimonialism. However, if these long-term visions and 
centralised rent collection are absent, such dynamics often fail to deliver, as can be seen in 
the various case studies in Whitfield et al. (2015). Often, SBRs take a more formal form, such 
as in Brazil and Mexico as described by Schneider (1997).  
 
When writing about SBRs Evans’ Embedded Autonomy (1995) is the seminal 
monograph to use as a starting point.  When writing about SBRs Evans’ Embedded Autonomy 
(1995) is the seminal monograph to use as a starting point. In this book, Evans stipulates his 
semi-Weberian typology of the ideal bureaucracy that separates developmental states from 
predatory states. Instead of being insulated from society (as Weber stipulates), bureaucracies 
should be “embedded” into the private sector, so that policies can be negotiated efficiently 
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and effectively. Moreover, these bureaucracies should be somewhat “autonomous” of the 
control of ruling elites. This basic notion forms the foundation of the mechanics behind 
SBR’s. However, this theory can be expanded to provide a more workable framework.  
 
For a more explanatory causal map on productive SBR’s, one can turn to Buur & 
Whitfeld’s (2015) framework. Although their model is intended for industrial policy, its 
components can prove highly useful for the research in question. View figure 1 below for a 
graphic depiction of the model.  
 
 
The pockets of efficiency dynamic, while important for general industrial policy, is 
not central to this research. What is important for this research is that which involves the 
domestic capitalists: its relationship with ruling elites and bureaucrats.  
 
Mutual interests: In order to form productive alliances, domestic capitalists and the 
ruling elites must be aiming for the same outcomes (In the case in question, improved 
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productivity and growth). Such an interest may take the form of rent-seeking, economic 
performance to boost approval ratings, or a combination of these (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi 
2012). Knowing that ruling elites have a vested interest in whatever goal capitalists are trying 
to achieve makes their commitment to policy strategies more credible, and leads to a 
reduction in policy uncertainty (Whitfield et al 2015, Maxfield and Schneider 1997) . Thus, 
mutual interests between capitalists and ruling elites can be very conducive for a successful 
relationship. Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2012) analyse the case of Rwanda, where ruling 
elites have significant personal financial stakes in various sectors. I call this a direct interest. 
However, mutual interests are often less clear. Often, they are political interests that show 
when policies favour certain constituencies, such as ethnicity (tribalism), classes, or 
inhabitants of certain geographical regions. These interests can be widely observed in 
Whitfeld’s case studies. 
 
Learning for productivity is a collective term by Buur and Whitfield (2015) that 
encompasses a number of conditions for a bureaucracy-business relation that enhances a 
sector’s productivity.  First, it is important to remember that capitalists pursue profit over 
anything. Thus, it is logical that policies requested by firms and farms (or their 
representatives) will lead to increased profits, but not necessarily to increased sector 
productivity and growth. In order to determine what policies will cause growth, bureaucratic 
institutions must be embedded (Whitfield et al 2015). Evans’ aforementioned book is centred 
on embeddedness of institutions, and is a useful reference. Evans describes embeddedness as 
dense links between the state and society. When talking about state-business relations, the 
term can be defined as dense links between state and capital (Evans 1995; 17).  This 
condition also carries implications for capitalists, namely for the manner in which they 
engage with the state. Maxfield and Schneider’s Business and the State in Developing 
 Paardekooper 13 
Countries (1997) is a highly useful resource for this concept. In various cases, they find that a 
concerted (represented by an organisation) sector can be highly conducive to a productive 
relationship between government and capital.  A productive learning for productivity 
dynamic will thus lead to policies where market failures are being addressed properly.  
 
Both of these conditions are crucial for a productive relationship. If the mutual 
interest condition is not met, one will see industrial policies being used for political ends 
without strengthening the sector. If the learning for productivity condition is not met, 
policies will likely lead to increased rent or profits for capitalists, but not productive sector 
growth. Whitfield et al. (2015) provide several case studies from Africa where these failed 
dynamics are demonstrated.  
 
In figure 2, the total causal process is illustrated by the author. All concepts are 
measurable through archives, interviews and government data (methods will be elaborated on 
below).
 
 
Following this theoretical framework, one can expect that a combination between 
mutual interests and learning for productivity mechanisms will lead to policies and 
regulations that address market failure and benefit the floriculture industry. In order to 
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analyse whether the relationship between the flower sector and the Kenyan state is conducive 
to the growth of the sector, we need to establish whether the two elements of the theoretical 
framework mentioned are present: mutual interests and learning for productivity. Using the 
data collection methods described below, the presence or absence of these conditions will be 
established to see whether SBR has been conducive or prohibitive to sector growth.   
5. Methods and case selection 
5.1 Methods 
This research is done using a single-case process tracing analysis.  As I will elaborate on 
below, the explosive growth of Kenyan floriculture is remarkable and qualifies it as a most-
likely case for our theory on SBRs. A single case study is thus in order.  As both the 
independent variable (state-business relations) and the dependent variable (sector growth) are 
known, the research will follow an inductive approach through which the causal process 
will be explored. In order to do this, the first step is to de-aggregate the “state-business 
relations” concept, as seen in the diagram above. This way it is easier to answer the 
individual sub-questions and get a clearer picture of the causal process. As many of the 
variables identified are hard to quantify, the majority of the research will depend on 
testimonies through archives and interviews.  
 
While Sen (2009, 2013)’s quantitative studies of SBR and growth in Africa are 
insightful, it is clear that they warrant a closer look at the dynamics observed. A single-N, 
intensive case study is suits the question and theory because of the complex dynamics that 
state-business relations entail. By limiting the study to one case, we can accurately map out 
the causal relationship between SBRs and growth in a holistic and nuanced manner. As with 
all single-N case studies, questioning the external validity of the study is a fair inquiry. Not 
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suggesting a monocausal relationship and centring the study on easily understandable and 
universally observable concepts addresses this question.  
 
For the analysis, data was collected primarily in two ways: interviews and desk 
research. Seven interviews were conducted with key experts and informants. The list of 
informants can be found in this document’s appendix. In addition to the interviews, I will 
search the online archives of Kenyan newspapers. The Star, the Daily Nation and the East 
African are each high-quality independent outlets from which reliable data can be extracted. 
 
 
5.2 Case selection: Floriculture in Kenya, 2002-2018 
 
This section will explain and defend the choice of case and timeframe. Additionally, this 
section will cover important backgrounds to the case in question. Although it does not 
directly pertain to the study, and does not apply the framework above, it is still essential 
information to have to understand the analysis that follows.  
 
Kenya has been a prominent object of study in Africa since its independence. Many 
factors of its political economy, including the relationship between capital and state, have 
been heavily studied (Seminal works are by Bates; 1985, 1989.) However, during “structural 
adjustment”, Kenya’s political economy was radically transformed (Rono 2012). Much of the 
qualitative work on Kenya has been before this transition, so it is valuable to conduct new 
research in these new circumstances. Kenya is not the only case of large-scale marketisation 
in Africa, so the results of this research will be applicable to many African countries that 
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have opened up their economy in recent decades. The floriculture industry is an excellent 
case study, as it is a sector that has seen sustained growth throughout changes in political 
coalitions, political instability, and economic crises. The political factors behind this growth 
have thus far received little attention, despite being an exemplary case for sustainable success 
in Africa. 
 
The timeframe is specifically explanatory for several reasons. First, as will be shown 
later, this is the timeframe where the growth of the examined industry was explosive. During 
this timeframe, the relationship between the state and the sector intensified and the effects are 
more easily examined. The selection of 2002 as the starting year is also of considerable 
political significance in the Kenyan context: in 2002, Daniel Arap Moi’s 22-year rule was 
ended, starting a period of heavily contested elections in which political settlements were 
very visible. Furthermore, government transparency and effectiveness also improved at this 
point. While corruption was still rife at all levels of government, it was not to the extent of 
the Moi era (Wrong 2009). 
 
Speaking in African terms, the flower industry in Kenya is highly organised. The 
Kenya Flower Council (KFC Henceforth) is the confederation of the vast majority of flower 
growers in Kenya. They primarily perform three activities: product regulation, industry 
promotion, and lobbying. For this research, only the latter activity is relevant. On behalf of 
the flower industry, they voice common concerns and try to influence policy in the industry’s 
favour. Additionally, they inform new cabinet members about the industry and try to make 
sure that policy stays relatively constant between governments1. One of their main allies is 
the Fresh Produce Exporters Association of Kenya (FPEAK), the business association for the 
                                                 
1
 J. Oudheusden, personal communication 
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greater horticulture sector. FPEAK and KFC often lobby under the collective banner of the 
Kenya Horticulture Council (KHC). This bundling of powers is sensible, since floriculture 
and vegetable producers are often looking for the same policy outcomes2. These national 
lobbies also coordinate efforts internationally through industry associations like Union 
Fleurs. Additionally, they are part of national business associations such as the Kenya 
Association of Manufacturers (KAM) and the Federation of Kenya Employers (FKE). On a 
local level, the national business associations are informed by local groups, such as the Lake 
Naivasha Growers Group and Mount Kenya growers group. These local associations have 
their own dialogue with local governments, which can be very influential3. Within these 
associations, market knowledge is shared between members and with the association (Bole 
2005)45. This gives the industry associations a great informational position, of which we will 
see evidence later in this study. 
Lobbyists have access to the governing powers through several channels, due to a 
programme started by Mwai Kibaki to make his plans for growth more public sector-driven. 
Locally, it seems that lobbying is a more personal and unofficial matter678. However, on the 
national level, large lobbies such as the KFC have access to various official channels, namely 
the Ministerial Stakeholders’ Forum, and the Presidential roundtable. In the Ministerial Fora, 
policies are formed with the aid of various civil society groups that the issue in question 
concerned. These fora have been shown to have significant policy impacts in various sectors 
(Gitau et al. 2008, World Bank 2013). At the presidential level, actors have access to 
Presidential Roundtables. While in this medium of communication representatives have 
                                                 
2
  J. Oudheusden, personal communication 
3
A. Kazimierzcuk, Personal communication, 01/05/2018 
4
 J. Mullary, Personal communication 
5
 E. Kiamba, Personal Communication 
A. 6Kazimierzcuk, Personal communication 
7
 J. Mullary, Personal communication 
8
 F. Holmquist, Personal Communication 
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access to the highest level of government, they do so simultaneously with representatives 
from all other major sectors in Kenya. For example,  the topic of the 2016 Round Table was 
“Kenya’s competitiveness”. Although the topics are broad, there are still significant victories 
to be gotten for the sector. Good examples of this are the National Horticulture Policy and the 
National Agriculture policy, which are strategic documents that KFC and its partners have 
contributed a significant amount of input into. 
 
6. Analysis: SBR and growth in Kenyan floriculture 
6.1 Dependent variable: Growth in the Kenyan Flower Sector 
Before analysing the effect of SBR on the growth of the sector, it is first important to describe 
the growth itself. Although we expect SBR to have had a significant effect on the growth, it is 
also crucial to identify the other factors that lead to this development. To get a perspective on 
the developments analysed in the next section, there should be a good awareness of the 
historical context.  
 
What do we mean by “growth”? While, as mentioned before, the volume and value of 
exported flowers has risen, there has not always been growth on all fronts. Lake Naivasha, 
the lake around which the majority of floriculture is situated, has lost significant amounts of 
water and its wildlife has suffered (Brecht and Harper 2002). Moreover, there have been 
complaints from the Maasai pastoralists that traditionally use the fertile lands around the lake 
as grazing areas (Kavilu 2016). Additionally, workers, particularly female workers have 
voiced serious concerns over working conditions (Hale and Opondo 2005).  While these 
concerns are real and should not be taken lightly, the focus of this research is on industry 
growth and increased value creation. Another good benchmark for productivity and growth in 
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global value chains such as Floriculture is competitiveness. Because of the increasing 
logistical linkages between Africa and the global north, the Kenyan flower industry is 
increasingly threatened by other producing countries with similar levels of productivity. 
Examples of this are Ethiopia, Tanzania and South Africa (Interviews91011, Proverde 2011, 
Kang’ Aru 2006). Any increase in export volume is thus usually paired with an increase in 
industry competitiveness. The theoretical implications of this will be discussed later, but it 
has significant implications for the relationship between state and business.  
 
Export agriculture is rooted in Kenyan history. During the era of British colonialism, 
the cultivation and extraction of “cash crops” by native peasants was a main function of the 
colonisation (Bates, 1981).  Even after independence, the export of coffee, tea and other cash 
crops remained a major driver of the Kenyan economy. In the late 1960s, the production of 
horticultural products started to take off. Originally, it was limited to processed products such 
as dehydrated fruits or canned pineapples due to the perishable nature of fresh goods. 
However, growth in the Kenyan tourism sector improved logistic linkages to Northern 
markets and gave Kenyan farmers access to Western markets for fresh fruit and vegetables. 
By the turn of the century, fresh fruit and vegetables heavily outnumbered processed food in 
terms of export value (Minot and Ngigi, 2004).  Significant state support for the horticulture 
sector can already be observed pre-2002. To facilitate the growth of this sector, the Kenyan 
government established the Horticultural Crops Development Authority, tasked with the 
regulation and facilitation of the horticulture sector. Until 1986, the organisation controlled 
the prices of horticulture products, but abandoned this policy to increase the role of the 
private sector in development (WTO 2000, EPZA 2005). Furthermore, they have provided 
                                                 
9
 A. Kazimierzcuk, Personal communication, 01/05/2018 
10
 M. Rutten, Personal Communication, 30/04/2018 
11
 F. Holmquist, Personal communication, 14/05/2018 
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technical support and facilities such as packing and cooling in order to facilitate the growth of 
the industry (Waarts and Meijerink 2010). The aforementioned logistical development of 
improved conditions for aircraft shipping also kick-started the floriculture industry in Kenya 
(Whitaker and Kolavalli 2006).The industry continued to grow, throughout the 1980s, but 
was constrained by the aforementioned logistical issues and a restrictive foreign trade regime 
(Whitaker and Kolavalli 2006).  
 
Source: HCDA. Chart by author. 
By the mid-1990s, both of these obstacles were removed, and the sector grew quickly. 
Exports nearly tripled between 1995 and 2002, and have since tripled again. Today, Kenya is 
the largest exporter to the European Union, which accounts for over half the Kenyan 
horticulture export. International capital plays a large role in the industry12. While climate, 
logistics and labour costs form a part of the explanation for this growth, favourable policy 
environments and government commitment are a significant factor (Bolo 2008, Veselinovic 
2015). Proverde’s competitiveness reports show us that a laissez-faire government approach 
has been highly valuable to the competitiveness of the sector, and that tax benefits are very 
successful in attracting new investors (Rikken 2011, 2012). HCDA’s commitment to 
                                                 
12
 Exact statistics for the proportion of international capital are unfortunately unavailable. 
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universal codes of conduct has been linked to significant reduction in transaction costs 
(Waarts & Meijerink 2010). While these developments are already indicative of productive 
SBRs, it is imperative that we analyse interactions based on the theory stipulated earlier. 
 
 6.2. Applying our theory to SBRs in the Kenyan flower sector 
To establish whether the nature of SBRs in our case is one that contributes to productivity 
and growth, we will now apply the aforementioned set of theories to the case.  
 
Mutual interests between ruling elites and the flower sector 
As one of the only successful export industries that the Kenya economy has, 
supporting floriculture will usually be in the ruling elites’ interest. The president actively 
spoke out in support of the sector in 2017. Both Kenya’s national trade deficit and public debt 
have been rising at alarming speeds (Munda 2017, Ngugi 2018). Both of these figures are 
highly significant for Kenyan elites, as a healthy economy and government budget allow 
them to sustain the system of graft and patronage that is so characteristic of the Kenyan 
Political Economy (Wrong, 2009). Keeping the national debt under control is also necessary 
to keep aid flows incoming.  
 
Additionally, like all political topics in Kenya, tribalism is bound to take leading role. 
As mentioned before, the flower industry is heavily geographically concentrated around Lake 
Naivasha. In this area, the largest native ethnicity is the Kikuyu people, with Kalenjin being 
the largest minority.  Mwai Kibaki’s cabinets mainly represented the Kikuyu peoples, while 
Uhuru Kenyatta’s cabinet is a coalition of Kikuyu and Kalenjin movements. Changes in 
ethnic government coalitions lead to differences in development paths of certain regions: 
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infrastructure spending and budget allocation have benefited population groups in power and 
deprived others (See Wrong (2009) and Holmquist (2002) for a detailed account of tribalist 
spending in Kenya). Thus, the tribalism factor is a good explanation for the continued 
commitment of ruling elites to the flower industry.  
 
While direct, personal mutual interests between ruling elites and the flower industry 
are not present in the Kibaki and Uhuru Kenyatta eras, the history of the industry seems to be 
grounded in this feature. Although this history falls outside the time frame of this study, it is 
important to touch upon to know the background of mutual commitments in the industry. The 
first international firm to invest in Kenya’s floriculture, the aforementioned Danish DCK, 
was generously invited by the Jomo Kenyatta regime. The man who orchestrated the deal was 
Agriculture minister Bruce Mackenzie. Mackenzie had a significant (undisclosed) amount of 
shares in DCK, and the firm got an incredibly generous incentive package to start its 
operations in Kenya. (Kamau 2018). As the industry grew, President Daniel Arap Moi also 
invested a significant amount of capital in flower farms, and a mutual commitment 
flourished. The most sizeable investment by Moi into the industry was a significant stake into 
Sian Roses, one of the largest rose farms in the country, which it still is today (WikiLeaks 
2007). The interests of Mackenzie and Moi, combined with the economic potential of the 
industry, led their regimes to make long-term commitments to the industry, creating a low-
risk investment climate for other investors. During the Kenyatta-Moi eras, policy influence 
from the executive was very strong, so indicators of personal commitment to the sector can 
be found in policy decisions (Ikiaria et al. 2005). Due to the back-door nature of personal 
interests in Kenya, it is hard to find specific policies that stem directly from Moi and 
McKenzie’s personal interests. However, the government’s laissez-faire nature towards the 
industry in the 1980’s and 1990’s has been shown to significantly benefit the industry (Bolo 
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2008, Interview13).  Thus, we can reasonably assume that the attitudes of ruling elites and 
capitalism towards the industry have converged.  
 
Learning for productivity in the Kenyan flower sector 
Previously, we have established that there has been a continuous and substantial mutual 
interest between the Kenyan flower sector and the Kenyan government. The second part of 
our successful SBR--formula is learning for productivity. Let us look back at Whitfeld et al.’s 
conditions for learning for productivity (numbers added by author): 
 
1. “Conditions for policy-generated rents must be linked to increases in 
productivity and to upgrading.  
2. State bureaucrats must be embedded in order for them to know the 
productivity constraints facing individual firms and the industry as a whole, and then be able 
to translate those needs into effective industrial policy through mediating the political 
objectives of ruling elites and the economic needs for the industry.  
3. Last, state bureaucrats must be able to enforce the new rules or conditions 
attached to rents for the relevant capitalists, which requires that capitalists are not able to 
use political connections and influence to undermine enforcement 
When these conditions emerge, we call it learning for productivity” (pp. 22). 
 
The flower market is highly elastic, as shown by the manner in which most are sold 
internationally: at auctions (Girapunthong and Ward 2002). Thus, the price of flowers is often 
the biggest determinant of revenue. As explained before, this is the main reason for the 
existence of the flower industry in Kenya: growers from Europe moved their operations to 
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Kenya due to the lower costs of labour and energy (Bolo 2008, Veselinovic 2015, 
Interviews1415). They could sell their products at lower prices than their European competitors 
could. However, the market has become less rosy for Kenyan growers. Kenya’s flower 
industry is heavily threatened by Ethiopia and Tanzania, where labour is cheaper (Andae 
2018, interviews16). Consequently, there seems to be no room for additional levies and 
increased rents that are not tied to increases in productivity. Because of the elasticity of the 
flower market, any rise in operating costs (or taxes / levies) could mean the move of a 
business to neighbouring countries, and a net loss for the rent collector. Furthermore, the 
employment loss that are stem from entrepreneurs relocating to other countries can cause 
serious political damage (Murage 2017). This evidence fulfils condition 1 of learning for 
productivity: increases in economic rents are always linked to increases in productivity.  
 
What makes the sector extremely special is its self-regulating nature. The flower 
export to the EU is precarious because of the strict regulations and standards that the EU and 
local supermarkets uphold (Gebreeyesus 2015). Based upon the national, European, and 
consumer standards KFC have created a ratings system, which has been described as one of 
the most rigid rating systems in the global flower industry (Interviews171819).  This way of 
regulating goes beyond Whitfeld et al.’s “ideal” bureaucracy: instead of having independent 
bureaucrats “embedded” in the sector, the market drives the sector to regulate itself on a 
firmer level than the government. Export driven as it is, the sector is dependent on meeting its 
own regulations, so in this case it is an efficient solution to the industry’s need for regulation. 
Next to the KFC regulations, the HCD has its own set of regulations and standards, 
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sanctioned by the government. However, the way in which these policies are developed and 
written is highly relevant here. The most relevant of these policy documents is Kenya 
Standards (KS) 1758. This policy is the most comprehensive of the sector, and covers most 
areas (Interviews2021). Export permits are given out on the basis of these standards. This type 
of regulatory bureaucracy, according to both Evans’ and Whitfeld’s frameworks, is the most 
facilitating form of bureaucracy: firmly embedded into the industry, and based on a rational-
legal order. The SBR in this case goes one step beyond in terms of embeddedness: the 
standards are written not only by embedded bureaucrats, but also by representatives of the 
sector itself. Condition 2 of learning for productivity is also met.  
 
Where the importance of SBR really becomes clear is in the enforcement of the 
policies mentioned above. As stated before, floriculture is an industry that is technologically 
highly sophisticated. Since many of the regulations are aimed at EU market entry, these are 
standards that pertain to bacteria levels, possible infestations of pests in the plants, and other 
highly complicated matters (The Star, 2017). It is as such that the HCD and the Kenya 
Bureau of Standards (KBS) handed over the duty of enforcing compliance to the above-
mentioned Kenya Horticulture Council. The KHC is informed and paid for by the sector 
rather than the government, so has the right technological human capital to ensure 
compliance with the regulations and standards set by the HCD and the KBS. While this 
seems like a fairly normal bureaucratic decision in the context of Western countries, a self-
regulating industry is fairly unique in Sub-Saharan Africa. Regulatory agencies are often used 
as vehicles for rent-seeking, and constitute parts of elaborate clientelist networks (Chabal and 
Daloz 1999). It also appears that the new regulating body operates more transparently and 
efficiently than the Kenyan bureaucracy does.  Interviews explain this anomaly. The global 
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flower sector works as such, that any exporting company not adhering to standards, damages 
the entire Kenyan flower industry (Interviews222324). Thus, in order to keep exports high and 
thus generating rents, it is imperative that the industry’s brand stays as positive as possible. 
The KHC is thus committed to integrity in distributing export licenses. This meets the third 
and final Learning for Productivity condition.  
 
According to the data collected, both mutual interests and learning for productivity 
have developed in the relationship over the course of our timeframe. To build upon this 
argument, there will be some examples of how interactions between the sector and the 
government have been beneficial for both parties.  
 
7. Proof of productive SBR in the Kenyan flower sector 
 
This section will discuss how interactions between the sector and the Kenyan government 
have benefitted the sector. It will focus on two areas in which SBRs have played a significant 
role, taxes and international treaties. 
 
7.1 Taxation 
Much of the dialogue between government and the sector is on taxation. Flower growers and 
breeders have always complained about high taxation rates, despite the continuing 
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environment of low regulation (Interview25, Riungu 2004).  For example, up until 2018, the 
floriculture industry was taxed both by the national government and the county (local) 
government (Murage 2018, Interview26). Both levels of government claimed that they 
provided substantial services to the sector, and levied considerably high taxes. Because of the 
KFC’s relationship with the government, they could easily access high-level policy 
environments, the ministerial stakeholders’ fora and the presidential roundtables 
(Interviews27,28).The prevalent discussion between the sector and the government is an 
interesting observation of SBR’s in Kenya. High tax rates continue to be a leading concern 
voiced by the industry (Interview29, Mungai 2016, Murage 2017). However, sector has gotten 
government support on the issue of operating costs through tax credits on import and research 
objectives (Kariuki 2018). The industry thus continues to see significant increases in exports 
and profit (Waitathu 2013, Kariuki 2018, Kenya Flower Council report 2017). This highlights 
the learning for productivity mechanic of SBRs: rents will only rise when they are tied to an 
increase in productivity. Embedded policy-makers have the technical expertise to identify 
that a decrease in rent collection has not been warranted, and are independent enough to be 
able to stick to this decision without being influenced by powerful lobbies. The tax question 
is still ongoing, but according to the theory used in this paper, tax rates will continue to 
decrease when operating costs are too high for the industry to remain competitive.  Since 
2018, the government has pledged to harmonise tax regimes to make them more favourable 
for the floriculture industry.  
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7.2 The process of signing the European Partnership Agreement 
One of the most visible and significant merits of state-business cooperation concerns 
the Economic Partnership Agreement (Henceforth EPA) signed between Kenya and the 
European Union. This case is a prime example of why strong links between public and 
private sectors can prove beneficial to all parties involved, and perfectly highlights the theory 
used in this paper.  
 
In 2016, the deadline for signing a new trade deal between the EU and the East 
African Community (EAC) was approaching. Under the incumbent trade deal, Kenya could 
export flowers into the EU completely free of tariffs. However, if the EAC were to miss the 
deadline, tariffs on Kenyan flowers would rise to over 10%. Other members of the EAC, who 
are all labelled as Least Developed Countries, would be able to export to the EU export-free 
either way because of the EU’s Anything But Arms policy, relieving all LDCs of tariffs on all 
products other than weapons. Consequently, Kenya’s neighbours were “not in a hurry” to 
sign the agreement (Middelburg, 2016). For Kenya’s flower industry, however, it was crucial 
that the agreement was signed, as producer costs would have proved too high with the high 
tariffs (Interview30, Middelburg 2016).  
 
Because of the highly organised nature of the flower sector, the industry not only had 
the expertise, but also the manpower to lobby the Kenyan government to make the EPA a 
top-of-the-agenda issue. KFC lobbied the government, and made clear what the loss of the 
flower sector would mean for the hundreds of thousands of Kenyans working in the sector 
(the majority of whom are from the coalition’s Kikuyu and Kalenjin constituencies).  The 
technical expertise and experience of the sector representatives was what persuaded the 
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Kenyan ruling elites to actively pursue the signing of the EPA between the EU and Kenya 
(Interview31). It was then the business associations who made the largest effort to resolve the 
issue: in late 2016, a trade delegation composed of Jane Ngige and Richard Fox from KFC, a 
representative from international umbrella association Union Fleurs and Kenyan trade 
minister Adan Mohammed. In the Brussels, the trade mission used the technical expertise of 
the sector as a diplomatic tool to persuade the EU to sign the EPA separately between the EU 
and Kenya, instead of waiting for the rest of the EAC to sign the agreement (Interview32). 
That this was an extremely important event for the industry was no exaggeration. If KFC had 
not properly lobbied the government, the industry would reportedly not have been able to sell 
their goods at market prices, and the industry would have been “destroyed” (Interview33, 
Florinews 2017).  
 
The interests of the flower industry and the ruling elites converged on signing the 
EPA. For the floriculture industry, signing the EPA was imperative because they could not 
afford to pay the high EU tariffs and stay competitive with other emerging producers. The 
Kenyan ruling elites’ interest came not only from the extraction of rents from the floriculture 
industry, but also political motives.  Since a considerable part of the ruling elite’s 
constituency (Kikuyu and Kalenjin) either works in or is dependent on floriculture, the 
survival and success of the industry is an understandable political priority for the ruling 
coalition (mutual interests). The embeddedness of the industry not only helped them to get 
this message across, to sign the agreement itself (Learning for productivity).   
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8. Conclusion and discussion 
8.1 Review and answer to the research question 
This research has sought to establish the nature of state-business relations in the Kenyan 
Flower sector, and its effect on sector productivity and competitiveness. I have found that, in 
this case, strong, collaborative alliances between the state and capital are a key political 
determinant of a successful sector. Using key informant interviews and archive research, we 
have found that there have been continuing mutual interests between Kenyan ruling elites and 
floriculture capitalists. We have also found that the coherence of the industry, in combination 
with an increasing embeddedness of the bureaucracy into the sector, has facilitated an 
environment where both parties collaborate to increase productivity and growth. To show 
this, we have presented several existential challenges to the industry that have been overcome 
because of a productive alliance between the public and the private spheres.  
8.2 Limitations to the study 
 
However, there are limitations to this study. As we have seen, it is hard to accurately map out 
the political process of policy formation. While many policies and regulations align with the 
interests of the industry, for many policies, laws, and regulations it is hard to definitively 
establish when they are the direct result of advocacy. However, through interviews and 
newspaper research, it is possible to confidently triangulate observations into a coherent 
picture. Furthermore, this research has only taken the “front-of-house” interactions into 
account. As we have discussed before, corruption and graft are notoriously endemic at all 
levels of Kenyan government. If it had been possible to view all communication (and 
transaction,) between the government and the industry, the picture would have been 
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considerably more comprehensive. Although some interactions may have been missed by 
studying only formal SBRs, the mechanisms are still valid.  
8.3 Further research and policy advice 
By collaborating with both national and international capital, the Kenyan bureaucracy has 
managed to utilise Kenya’s comparative advantages optimally and facilitated to turn the 
Kenyan flower industry, a highly sophisticated and technological global sector, into a 
globally leading producer. In a geographical region that is often characterised by public 
mismanagement, corruption and graft, this can be fairly called an extraordinary feat. In the 
literature review at the beginning of this paper, I noted that state-business relations play a 
minor role in the literature on African development. Given the insights that result from this 
paper’s analyses, I argue that this is unjustified, and that the relationships between capitalists, 
bureaucrats and ruling elites are essential to sector growth. Further research should take this 
determinant into account, as well as look into its mechanisms in other cases. 
 
This case study holds significant lessons for industry in post-Washington consensus 
Africa.  Firstly, industry associations possess technical expertise that is sometimes required to 
make international trade deals when used in combination with a government’s diplomatic 
machine. Secondly, it can be very beneficial to have a bureaucracy that is embedded into an 
industry, sometimes to the point of handing over some government duties to industry 
representatives. Thirdly, effective communication of credible commitments between the 
government and the sector can reduce risks and promote investments. Donors, IFI’s and other 
actors in development should aim to promote these close relations between business and 
government.   
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2. Agnieszka Kazimierczuk is a PhD candidate and researcher at the African 
Studies Centre in Leiden. She has done much research on the floriculture industry in 
particular, and has an excellent birds-eye view of the political nuances. 
3. Jeroen Oudheusden is the executive officer for the Floriculture Sustainability 
Initiative 2020. He has worked with Kenya for the past 5 years. 
4. Sally Roberts is a senior employee at a major flower breeder operating in 
Kenya.  
5. Prof. Dr. Frank Holmquist is a Professor Emiretus at the University of 
Massachusetts. He is an expert on the topic of State-business relations in Kenya, and has 
written an influential piece on the topic.  
6. Johnstone Mulary is the lead lobbyist for the Kenya flower council. He has 
been in this position since 2014. 
7. Elizabeth Kiamba is an Agricultural Officer at the embassy of the 
Netherlands in Nairobi.  
 
